



IN THE ALABAMA COURT OF THE JUDICIARY

IN THE MATTER OF:)
HENRY P. ALLRED,) Court of the Judiciary
District Judge,) Case No. 53
Walker County, AL)

COMPLAINT

The Judicial Inquiry Commission of the State of Alabama (hereinafter "The Commission") files this Complaint against Judge Henry P. Allred (hereinafter "Judge Allred"), District Judge in Walker County, Alabama. The Commission alleges and charges as follows:

I. Introduction

1. Judge Allred took office as District Court Judge in Walker County, Alabama, on January 20, 2009, and continues to serve in that capacity. At the time of the events underlying this Complaint, Judge Allred had served seven years.

2. This Complaint charges Judge Allred with violations of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics by:

a. Failing to respect the authority of another court presiding in cases involving Judge Allred's relatives, more specifically, by ignoring that court's

lawful order and sanctioning and enabling his relatives' violations of that order;

b. Taking advantage of his judicial status for special consideration and advantage not accorded to the ordinary citizen under the same circumstances;

c. Initiating ex-parte communications with the other judge regarding the pending cases; the pending dependency petition regarding the older child, filed by the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR"); a related pending contempt petition; and a related impending contempt proceeding—all involving his relatives; and

d. Unnecessarily creating an "emergency" that was prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute.

3. This Complaint arises from Judge Allred's actions, in April 2016, regarding two juvenile-dependency and custody cases pending before a judge in another county. Judge Allred was not a party to those cases, but they involved Judge Allred's relatives, i.e., the children, the children's parents, Judge Allred's father and stepmother ("Judge Allred's parents"), and the custodians of one of

the children are all related to Judge Allred. Without reading the court order specifying the requirements for custody and visitation, Judge Allred agreed to take actions that were contrary to plain provisions of that order. He also enabled his parents and the children's parents to violate the order. After their violations and Judge Allred's prospective actions generated controversy with DHR, the guardian ad litem ("GAL"), and others, on the Friday afternoon that weekend visitation was to start at 5:00 p.m., Judge Allred contacted the juvenile judge around 6:00 p.m. He requested and received emergency oral authorization to deviate from the court order—despite the facts that he was not a party, that some parties and the children were represented by counsel, that DHR and child advocates were involved, and that he was unaware of unfolding events and legal filings in the cases. (The juvenile judge was likewise unaware a related contempt petition had been filed that afternoon.) To execute the juvenile judge's oral authorization, Judge Allred summoned local law enforcement to retrieve custody of one of the children because that child's custodians, to avoid any possibility of being in contempt, were insisting on a

written court order modifying the court's original order. Judge Allred's actions in taking custody of that child pursuant to an oral authorization created emotionally charged controversy, confusion, and confrontation regarding the legal significance of an "oral order" in child custody/visitation. But for Judge Allred's judicial status, law enforcement would not have facilitated or enforced the exchange.

II. Facts¹

4. On April 7, 2016, petitions for determination of dependency and custody and motions for emergency ex-parte custody of two minor children were filed in the Juvenile Court of Marshall County, the county of their residence: "the older child," who was eight years old, and "the baby," JU-16-246.01 and JU-16-247.01, respectively. The petitioners are relatives of the children. The children's father abused alcohol, and their mother had a long history of substance abuse, both triggering marital discord and potential domestic-violence situations. Family

¹ Because the factual context of this Complaint regards specific juvenile cases, specific identities of all involved are filed under seal. See Attachment A.

intervention, in which Judge Allred had not participated, had been unsuccessful.

5. The petitions were assigned to District Judge John Mastin, Juvenile Court of Marshall County. He immediately entered an emergency ex-parte order, granting the petitioners temporary custody of both children and appointing a GAL. He also held a five-hour emergency hearing that day.

6. The following day, April 8, 2016, Judge Mastin issued a temporary order ("Temporary Order"). He found that a temporary emergency situation placed the children in imminent risk of harm, danger, and/or neglect, due to the father's use of alcohol and the mother's unsuccessful efforts to treat her drug addiction.

a. As to the baby, Judge Mastin ordered:

- i. Joint temporary legal and physical custody to the petitioners and the children's parents;
- ii. Temporary physical custody to the petitioners;
- iii. Visitation to the children's parents every weekend, from 5:00 p.m. Friday until 6:00 p.m. Sunday, to be supervised by Judge Allred's parents; and

iv. The supervised visitation to take place at the residence of Judge Allred's parents.

b. As to the older child, Judge Mastin ordered:

i. Joint temporary legal and physical custody to Judge Allred's parents and the children's parents;

ii. But the child is to reside with Judge Allred's parents;

iii. "Reasonable supervised visitation" to the mother at the discretion of Judge Allred's parents (emphasis in original); and

iv. "Reasonable visitation [to the father] at the discretion of Judge Allred's parents as long as he [is] not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and [is] in compliance with color code drug testing."

c. As to the family, Judge Mastin ordered:

i. The children's parents "shall randomly drug test through the Marshall County Court Referral color code testing program with the results of such available to both parties."

- ii. Judge Allred's parents are made parties due to the conditions of custody and visitation.
 - iii. Because of the substance-abuse issues of the children's mother, Judge Allred's parents are to secure all prescription drugs in their home prior to visitation.
 - iv. "No party is to consume alcohol in the presence of the minor children or while the children are in the home."
- d. As to the children's father, Judge Mastin ordered him to cease consumption of alcohol.
- e. As to the children's mother, Judge Mastin issued specific requirements for substance-abuse-and-addiction treatment, monitoring, and progress reports.
- f. Judge Mastin specifically acknowledged the "serious and substantially fractured relationship between the parents and [the older child], as a result of but not limited to drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence allegations and/or marital discord caused by drug and/or alcohol abuse."

g. Judge Mastin added "Court Appointed Juvenile Advocates" ("CAJA"), as a party to investigate and report to the Court; gave DHR access to the proceedings to determine if it should intervene; and requested CAJA, DHR, and the GAL to expedite their findings and reports to the Court.

h. Finally, Judge Mastin ordered, "[T]his Order shall remain in full force and effect until changed, modified or set aside by this Court."

7. Judge Mastin set a hearing on the merits for June 1, 2016.

8. The third visitation weekend after the issuance of Temporary Order was to occur the weekend of April 29, 2016. Judge Allred's parents—who were the only designated supervisors for the weekend visitation of the children's mother with the baby and in whose residence that visitation was specified to occur per Temporary Order—had not disclosed to the Court that they had a prepaid, nonrefundable vacation they had planned before the hearing. The vacation was from Wednesday, April 27, until Monday, May 1, 2016.

9. Judge Allred knew that his parents were leaving town that Wednesday.² He and his parents, who did not have an attorney representing them in the juvenile cases, had discussions about "what to do" so they could go on vacation, and Judge Allred "gave them [his] thoughts on that" without ever reading Temporary Order.³

10. Judge Allred was told the children's mother was not to be alone with the children,⁴ so his discussions with his parents included possible options for supervision of the older child from Wednesday to Friday, such as the child's staying with Judge Allred at his parents' residence (which would necessitate his rearranging his court schedule) or staying at Judge Allred's residence (which would require the child to miss school).⁵

11. In addition, the children's father asked Judge Allred for advice.⁶ The children's father also consulted

² May 16, 2016 Contempt Hearing, Judge Allred's Testimony, R. 78.

³ Id. at R. 82. See also R. 56.

⁴ Id. at R. 86.

⁵ Id. at R. 57.

⁶ Id. at R. 113.

with the GAL on April 18 about the pending vacation and visitation and with his attorney who had talked with the GAL on April 11. (The GAL told the attorney that the order was the order and said what it said and that the children's father would have to answer to the Court for any action he took with the attorney's advice.⁷)

12. Rather than forgo their trip, Judge Allred's parents asked Judge Allred to supervise that weekend's visitation of the children's parents with both children, to take place at Judge Allred's residence.

13. Judge Allred was asked to supervise, in part, because "he's a juvenile court judge," and he was an "acceptable supervisor" because "it's his job to take children out of households."⁸

14. Judge Allred agreed to supervise and to supervise at his residence, which was not under court mandate to have all prescription drugs secured.

15. Because this plan was not part of any court order or allowable under any court order, Judge Allred should

⁷ May 16, 2016 Contempt Hearing, GAL's Testimony, R. 127.

⁸ May 16, 2016 Contempt Hearing, Mother's Testimony, R. 42, and Father's Testimony, R. 115, respectively.

have insisted his parents and/or the children's parents go through the proper procedure of timely seeking modification of Temporary Order or Court approval. Instead, he wrongly concluded that, because all the parties supposedly were in agreement, no one could be found in contempt for violating Temporary Order on the third weekend visitation since its issuance only 19 days earlier.⁹

16. At 2:02 p.m. on Wednesday, April 27, 2016, Judge Allred sent a text message to petitioner/baby's custodian, stating:

Hey man. Since [my parents] are gone to the beach this weekend, [my wife] and I are gonna let [the children's parents] stay the weekend with us so they can visit [the baby], so y'all can just bring [the baby] to my house on Friday evening.

The response was "Ok. No problem."

17. When Judge Allred's parents left that same afternoon, April 27, they left the older child to stay with the child's parents at the latter's residence until Friday, April 29, and on Sunday night, May 1. They did so despite Temporary Order's recognition of the "serious and substantially fractured relationship between the parents

⁹ Judge Allred's JIC Testimony, R. 7.

and [the older child],” and despite the requirements that the child reside with Judge Allred’s parents; the children’s mother receive “reasonable” supervised visitation at the discretion of Judge Allred’s parents; and the children’s father receive visitation at the discretion of Judge Allred’s parents as long as he is not under the influence of alcohol or any drugs.

18. No order—oral or written—was ever entered nor was any request made allowing for the older child to stay at the residence of the children’s parents Wednesday through Friday and Sunday night, allowing the children’s father to supervise the mother’s visitation, or allowing the children’s father continuous custody over multiple days without Judge Allred’s parents’ monitoring his sobriety.

19. When the petitioners/baby’s custodians consented on Wednesday to Judge Allred’s supervising the weekend visitation, they assumed Judge Allred’s parents were leaving on Friday, April 29, rather than on Wednesday. Therefore, they were not aware that Temporary Order’s requirements regarding the older child would not be followed Wednesday through Friday.

20. On Thursday afternoon, DHR filed a dependency petition regarding the older child based on the report that Judge Allred's parents "have left town to go on a beach trip and have left [the older child] in the care of [the child's parents]."

21. At 10:32 a.m. on Friday, Judge Mastin denied DHR's request for a pick-up order.

22. After lunch on Friday, the petitioners/baby's custodians were notified that DHR and/or CAJA, the attorneys, and the GAL had concerns about violations of Temporary Order by Judge Allred's parents and the children's parents. (That is how the petitioners/baby's custodians found out Judge Allred's parents had left town Wednesday.)

23. Thereafter, the petitioners/baby's custodians consulted with Mr. Shane Holloway, their attorney, about Judge Allred's plan for weekend supervision, which was to begin in a few hours, i.e., at 5:00 p.m. Their attorney advised them not to take the baby to Judge Allred's residence because they could be in contempt of Temporary Order, which explicitly stated Judge Allred's parents were to supervise the visitation at their residence, i.e., they

would not be following the order any better than Judge Allred's parents.

24. At 3:00 p.m., the attorney for the petitioners/baby's custodians filed "Motion for Contempt and Emergency Custody" against the children's parents and requested immediate transfer of the older child to the petitioners/baby's custodians; temporary suspension of the visitation of the children's parents; and removal of Judge Allred's parents as supervisors of visitation. The motion, in addition to alleging violation of Temporary Order during the period Judge Allred's parents were on vacation, alleged Judge Allred's parents had allowed the children's father to supervise the mother's visitation of the older child at the residence of the children's parents numerous times, beginning shortly after Temporary Order was entered on April 8, 2019.¹⁰

25. The 3:00 p.m. motion observed that the petitioners/baby's custodians "are due to turn over the

¹⁰ The children's parents testified at the subsequent contempt hearing that Temporary Order was not clear. However, no one filed a motion for clarification.

baby . . . to [Judge Allred's parents] this evening at 5:00 p.m., who are at the beach."

26. At around 5:00 p.m., the attorney for the petitioners/baby's custodians advised them not to take the baby to Judge Allred's residence because Judge Mastin had not approved anything.

27. At 5:01 p.m., Judge Allred sent the petitioners/baby's custodians the text: "Y'all on your way?"

28. The petitioners/baby's custodians then called Judge Allred and explained they had been on the telephone with their attorney for two hours to get him approved, but Temporary Order did not list him as anyone allowed to supervise visitation, so they were not bringing the baby because they were afraid they would be in contempt.¹¹

29. At 5:19 p.m., the petitioners/baby's custodians received another text from Judge Allred: "Y'all better get that child over here immediately."

30. Around 6:00 p.m., Judge Allred obtained Judge Mastin's cellphone number from a lawyer-friend and called

¹¹ Judge Allred's JIC Testimony, R. 7; May 16, 2016 Contempt Hearing, Judge Allred's Testimony, R. 59.

Judge Mastin, who was at an out-to-town baseball game with his family.

31. Upon Judge Allred's request to supervise the weekend visitation,¹² Judge Mastin stated he did not have a problem with Judge Allred supervising, "which is what [Judge Allred] thought would be the response."¹³ Judge Allred asked Judge Mastin if Judge Mastin would hold "these people" in contempt if Judge Allred supervised the visitation. Judge Mastin said of course he would not, and he would try to call the attorney for the petitioners/baby's custodians.

32. Had an ordinary citizen contacted Judge Mastin about a request pertaining to a juvenile case, Judge Mastin would not have answered that person; instead, he would have interrupted that person and declared he could not discuss a juvenile case. He took Judge Allred's word for the fact that the parties agreed to the change in supervision.

¹² There does not appear to have been any discussion about the place for supervision, i.e., Judge Allred's residence or the residence of his parents, the latter required by Temporary Order.

¹³ May 16, 2016 Contempt Hearing, Judge Allred's Testimony, R. 83.

33. Judge Mastin was at a disadvantage in making this decision. He was not aware—and Judge Allred did not inform him because he himself was unaware—of the concerns that morning of the GAL, DHR and/or CAJA, and other attorneys or of the motion for contempt the petitioners/baby's custodians had filed.

34. Thereafter, Judge Allred called the sheriff's office dispatch and explained he needed a deputy to go with him on a child-custody issue to ensure there was not any problem.

35. Deputy Investigator Ralph Williams responded to Judge Allred's residence. There, Judge Allred explained he had received verbal authorization from Judge Mastin to supervise visitation.

36. Judge Allred, accompanied by Investigator Williams and the children's mother, went to the residence of the petitioners/baby's custodians, but they were not there.

37. Sometime after 6:00 p.m., Judge Allred called one of the petitioners/baby's custodians who explained they were at dinner. (The electricity was out at their residence.) Judge Allred replied that he had contacted Judge Mastin and received verbal authorization to supervise

the visitation. That petitioner/baby's custodian again told Judge Allred he would not relinquish the baby until his attorney told him he could or until he had a court order in his hand. Judge Allred replied that he had called the sheriff's office, gotten a deputy to come with him, and was coming to pick up the baby.

38. At that point, Deputy Investigator Williams spoke with that petitioner/baby's custodian, and told him that Judge Allred had a "verbal order" from the juvenile judge to take custody of the baby.¹⁴ That petitioner/baby's custodian responded that a verbal order is not a valid judicial order and he wanted something in his hand before he relinquished custody of the baby.

39. Judge Allred then called Jasper Police Chief J.C. Poe, the supervisor of that petitioner/baby's custodian. Judge Allred said, in effect, he had a verbal order from another judge to obtain the baby; he and a deputy were at the residence of the petitioners/baby's custodians; and the

¹⁴ Williams testified before the Commission, "I threw the word around 'verbal order' multiple times because the way I look at it: when a judge tells you something without something in writing, that it's verbal." (R. 13.)

petitioners/baby's custodians were on their way home.

Chief Poe said he would come over.

40. On his way, Chief Poe called that petitioner/baby's custodian and informed him that Judge Allred had called him and that he (Chief Poe) would meet him at his house.

41. Then, the other petitioner/baby's custodian informed their attorney, by email or text, that they were being told Judge Allred had a verbal order.

42. The attorney for the petitioners/baby's custodians then called Judge Mastin and told him they did not have a problem with the supervisor substitution. Judge Mastin asked about any safety concerns. With the attorney's assurance there were none, Judge Mastin stated he did not have a problem with the supervisor substitution.

43. The attorney informed the petitioners/baby's custodians when they were a few minutes from their residence that Judge Mastin had not issued an order, but did not have a problem with the substitution.

44. When the petitioners/baby's custodians arrived at their residence or shortly thereafter, the following persons were there: Judge Allred, Chief Poe, Deputy Investigator Williams, and Lieutenant Jeremy Lockhart, who

had been summoned by Chief Poe and was the immediate supervisor of one of the petitioners/baby's custodians.

45. The same petitioner/baby's custodian got out of his vehicle and talked with Judge Allred for a few minutes. In a somewhat heated discussion, the following was said¹⁵:

Judge: I was supposed to supervise all weekend. . . .

P/BC¹⁶: Where's the order that says that, Henry?

Judge: Your lawyer will have it.^[17] I talked to the judge. You think I'm lying? Call me a liar in front of these three guys [i.e., the officers].

P/BC: I don't have to all you a liar. I can call you a lot worse.

Judge: You better hope I'm always a judge cause when I'm not

46. During this meeting, Chief Poe stepped aside with that petitioner/baby's custodian and asked him if the baby

¹⁵ Part of the encounter was audio recorded, but not all conversation was captured.

¹⁶ That petitioner/baby's custodian.

¹⁷ In his testimony at the subsequent contempt hearing, Judge Allred twice denied he had told that petitioner/baby's custodian he had an oral or verbal order from Judge Mastin for him to supervise. (R. 69-70.) He also twice denied that he had told anyone at the scene that he had a verbal or oral order. (R. 80, 84.) He testified, "I said I talked to Judge Mastin. There is no problem with me supervising." (R. 70.)

was going to be in any danger if Judge Allred supervised. His answer was no, but he just wanted an order in hand before transferring custody for the weekend visitation. Chief Poe advised him it would be best to relinquish custody rather than risk being in legal trouble with the judge who had apparently issued the order.

47. That same petitioner/baby's custodian thereafter agreed to give the baby to Judge Allred.

48. Before everyone left, Judge Allred stated, "I'm a family court judge. This is what I do. I know what I'm doing."¹⁸

49. After Judge Allred left with the baby, the same petitioner/baby's custodian told the three officers:

Henry gets upset and gets mad so he starts calling his judge buddies But he shouldn't be using the fact that he's a judge out here trying to referee to get his way with me. You know, tonight he's not a judge. He's just a whoever, somebody that's not even named in any paperwork.

50. The three law enforcement officers were clearly affected by Judge Allred's judicial status.

a. Lieutenant Lockhart behaved differently because of Judge Allred's judicial status:

¹⁸ Lockhart's JIC Testimony, R. 8, 12.

I didn't really like it, because normally we require if somebody . . . say[s] they have an order, we want to see that order, you know. And there wasn't one.

But like I said, you don't want to cross a judge. And if he says that he has a verbal order, I mean, . . . he's pretty much the law, so he got his way.¹⁹

He felt that law enforcement was there to "see that [Judge Allred] had his way."²⁰

b. Deputy Investigator Williams answered Judge Allred's call instead of sending a rookie because he tries to maintain a good relationship with the judges and help them with whatever they need. His rule is: "You don't mess with a judge."²¹ He did not question Judge Allred about the verbal authorization to take custody of the baby because he does not ever question a judge. However, had a citizen made such a representation, he would not have believed him/her; rather, he would have insisted on talking to the judge who had allegedly given the order.

¹⁹ Id. at R. 6-7.

²⁰ Id. at R. 6.

²¹ Williams JIC Testimony, R. 11.

c. Chief Poe concluded that Judge Allred was using his judicial status because he had a deputy there to enforce the order he wanted enforced. Moreover, this was the only time Judge Allred had ever called Chief Poe, so under the circumstances, it appeared to Chief Poe that Judge Allred called him because Judge Allred wanted him to exercise his authority as the supervisor of that petitioner/baby's custodian. Had an ordinary citizen called complaining that one of the Chief's officers was being difficult regarding custody transfer, Chief Poe would not have gone to the scene before talking with the supervisor on the scene.

51. On May 5, 2016, DHR filed a motion to intervene in the case regarding the baby.

52. On May 16, 2016, Judge Mastin held a hearing on the contempt petition. Four attorneys, six parties, and representatives of DHR (two counties) and CAJA appeared.

53. On May 20, 2016, Judge Mastin issued an order denying the motion for contempt.

54. The following provisions of that Order demonstrate Judge Mastin's continued concern regarding supervision of the mother's visitation and protection of the children:

2. While the intent of the Court was clear as a result of the findings, the intent was not clearly stated as to remove any ambiguity regarding the supervision of visitation.
3. In order to provide clarity the Court states the following:
 - a. The [children's] father . . . shall not be the supervisor for the visitation between [the children's mother] and either child.
 - b. Therefore should [the children's father] be exercising any of his visitation in the presence of [the children's mother] then either [parent of Judge Allred] or another individual who is pre-approved by both DHR and the G.A.L. shall be present.
4. Should [either of Judge Allred's parents] not be available to supervise a particular supervision then they shall name another individual who is pre-approved by both DHR and the G.A.L. to be present and supervise the visitation.
5. Should there be any further question of what is or is not compliant with any existing Court Order then the party (or parties) shall seek clarification prior to the situation rather than after the fact.

. . . .

7. This Order shall remain in full force and effect until changed, modified or set aside by this Court.

(Emphasis in original.)

55. As a judge, Judge Allred should have known the inherent dangers of attempting to intervene in another

judge's case and engaging in ex-parte communications without all interested parties and persons present. Instead of referring his relatives to the judicial process to timely modify Temporary Order, he sought to solve the issues raised himself, with the use of his judicial status. Yet, after hearing the facts in a subsequent court proceeding with all parties and attorneys present, i.e., the contempt hearing, Judge Mastin again emphasized the requirements for the strict supervision of the visitation of the children's mother, with the admonition that any issues be timely presented before they become a crisis and with the emphasis that the children's parents and Judge Allred's parents cannot alone determine supervision substitution.

III. CHARGES

Charges 1 & 2

Failure to Respect the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice

56. Judge Allred violated the following provisions of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics by ignoring another court's lawful order (i.e., Temporary Order, by not even reading it) in cases involving his relatives,

taking actions that were contrary to that order, and/or condoning and/or enabling violations of that order by the children's parents and by Judge Allred's parents:

- Canon 1: A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
- A judge should participate in . . . maintaining . . . and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.
- Canon 2: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
- Canon 2A: A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
- Canon 2B: A judge . . . should avoid conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.

57. Judge Allred violated the provisions of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, specifically listed in Paragraph 55, and the following provision, by unnecessarily creating an "emergency" for the deviation by him and his relatives of the visitation requirements and/or by attempting to obtain the baby pursuant to an oral authorization, thereby creating emotionally-charged controversy, confusion, and

confrontation regarding the legal significance of an "oral order" in child custody/visitation and necessitating further litigation and expenditure of law-enforcement resources, judicial resources, DHR and CAJA resources, and additional legal fees:

Canon 2B: A judge should at all times maintain the decorum and temperance befitting his office

Count 3

Use of the Prestige of the Office

58. Judge Allred violated the provisions of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, specifically listed in Paragraph 55, and the following provisions, by taking advantage of his judicial status for special consideration regarding cases involving his relatives, an advantage not accorded to the ordinary citizen under the same circumstances, i.e., he intervened in a proceeding in Judge Mastin's court by securing an ex-parte, oral deviation from an order in confidential juvenile cases, and he required the services of law enforcement to enforce an "oral order" in child custody/visitation:

Canon 2B: A judge should at all times maintain the decorum and temperance befitting his office

Canon 2C: A judge should not allow his family . . . to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others

Count 4

Ex-Parte Communications


59. Judge Allred violated the provisions of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, specifically listed in Paragraph 55, and the following provision, by initiating ex-parte communications with another judge regarding cases involving Judge Allred's relatives, i.e., the pending child-custody cases, DHR's dependency petition regarding the older child, the pending contempt motion, the impending DHR's motion to intervene in the baby's case, and/or the impending contempt proceeding against Judge Allred's parents:

Canon 2C: A judge should not allow his family . . . to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others

Canon 3A(4): A judge should . . . [not] initiate . . . ex parte communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.

Done this 20th day of September, 2019.

THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Billy C. Bedsole", written over a horizontal line.

Billy C. Bedsole
Chairman

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

ATTACHMENT A

[This page is intentionally left blank; confidential
information is filed in separate envelope.]